From Clientelism to Capability: Reclaiming Welfare in Caste-Divided India

 From Clientelism to Capability: Reclaiming Welfare in Caste-Divided India

By Rahul Ramya, 15th June 2025

1. Introduction: Welfare, Caste & Capabilities

Clientelism refers to a political practice where politicians or parties provide direct material benefits—such as cash, food, jobs, or housing—in exchange for political support, usually votes. Instead of building long-term public infrastructure or empowering citizens, clientelism relies on short-term, targeted aid to secure loyalty, especially from marginalized or economically vulnerable groups.

In the Indian context, clientelism often plays out through welfare schemes that favor immediate relief (like LPG connections or cash transfers) rather than investing in structural improvements like education, health, or employment—thus reinforcing dependency rather than enabling autonomy and upward mobility.

Clientelist welfare policies—government schemes that exchange direct benefits like cash transfers, housing, or food subsidies for electoral loyalty—offer short-term consumption security but often undermine long-term empowerment. This essay argues that welfare must prioritize structural empowerment over transactional handouts, particularly for marginalized caste groups such as Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBCs).

Drawing inspiration from the capabilities approach, pioneered by Martha Nussbaum and expanded by Jean Drèze and others in the Indian context, which emphasizes expanding individuals’ real freedoms to lead lives they value through education, health, and political agency, we contend that welfare policies must enable genuine human flourishing rather than perpetuate dependency. As Nussbaum argues, the capabilities approach is concerned with what people are able to do and be, not merely with the resources they possess. This distinction becomes crucial when examining how welfare translates into meaningful life opportunities for marginalized communities.

In India, caste shapes access to resources and opportunities, making it a critical lens for evaluating welfare’s impact. While clientelist schemes may alleviate immediate poverty, they often fail to address structural inequalities, entrenching dependency rather than fostering agency. This essay examines how welfare policies across Indian states succeed or fail in building capabilities, critiques the clientelist dynamics in caste politics, and proposes reforms to align welfare with empowerment for a more equitable democracy.

2. Theoretical Framework: Capabilities, Public Action, and Structural Inequality

2.1 The Capabilities Approach in Indian Context

Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach and later on Martha Nussbaum’s works provide a robust framework for evaluating welfare effectiveness beyond simple resource distribution. The approach identifies central human capabilities including life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses and imagination, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, play, and control over one’s environment. In the Indian context, these capabilities intersect profoundly with caste-based exclusions, where structural discrimination limits the conversion of resources into meaningful freedoms.

Jean Drèze’s work on public action theory complements this framework by emphasizing how democratic participation and civil society engagement can transform welfare delivery. As Drèze argues, the success of welfare policies depends not just on government provision but on active citizen participation in demanding accountability and shaping implementation. This becomes particularly relevant for marginalized caste communities who have historically been excluded from political processes.

Kaushik Basu’s insights on institutional economics further illuminate how power structures and social norms affect welfare outcomes. His analysis of how informal institutions—including caste hierarchies—interact with formal welfare schemes reveals why well-intentioned policies often fail to reach their intended beneficiaries or achieve transformative impact.

2.2 Caste-Wise Inequality & Welfare Dependency

India’s stark inequalities highlight the limitations of clientelist welfare in achieving equitable development. The top 10% of earners capture approximately 57.7% of national income, while the bottom 50% of urban Indians survive on less than ₹5,000 per month; rural SC/ST and OBC households often earn even less (World Inequality Database, 2024). The 2023 Bihar caste survey provides a granular view of these disparities:

Poverty Rates: 42.93% of SC and 42.7% of ST households earn ≤₹6,000 monthly, compared to 33.6% of OBCs, 33.2% of Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs), and 25.1% of General category households.

Education:  Graduate attainment stands at 13.4% for upper castes, 6.8% for Backward Classes (BC), 4.3% for EBCs, and 3.0% for SCs.

These gaps underscore that welfare schemes, while providing immediate relief through cash transfers or quotas, have not achieved capability equity—equal access to opportunities that enable individuals to convert resources into meaningful outcomes like literacy, health, or economic mobility. Following Nussbaum’s framework, true welfare success requires enabling all individuals to achieve valued “beings and doings” regardless of their caste background.

Clientelism often prioritizes visible, vote-winning handouts over structural reforms, perpetuating dependency among marginalized castes. This aligns with Drèze’s critique of passive welfare delivery that fails to build democratic agency among recipients.

Chart: Caste-Wise Poverty Rates in Bihar

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Caste-Wise Poverty Rates in Bihar (≤₹6,000/month)

SC |████████████████████████████████████████████ 42.93%

ST |███████████████████████████████████████████▌ 42.7%

OBC |██████████████████████████████████▌ 33.6%

EBC |█████████████████████████████████▌ 33.2%

General|█████████████████████████▌ 25.1%

0 10 20 30 40 50

Percentage of Households (%)

```

This chart underscores the urgent need for welfare policies that address structural barriers to capability expansion, particularly for SC/ST communities.

3. Healthcare Inequities: Class, Caste, and Capability Deficits

3.1 Urban Concentration of Medical Infrastructure - A Capabilities Crisis

The concentration of medical personnel and facilities in urban centers represents one of India’s most pronounced capability deficits, systematically excluding marginalized caste groups from fundamental health freedoms. More than 80 per cent of doctors, 75 per cent of dispensaries, 60 per cent of hospitals are concentrated in urban India, leaving out marginalised population to fend for themselves. This spatial apartheid in healthcare access directly undermines the capability framework’s emphasis on converting resources into meaningful health outcomes.

The urban-rural healthcare divide maps directly onto caste hierarchies, as marginalized communities are disproportionately concentrated in rural areas. Approximately 86% of medical visits in India are from individuals living in rural areas, with a majority traveling over 100 km to reach available healthcare facilities, and where 70-80% of the cost is paid out-of-pocket. This creates a double burden: SC/ST and OBC communities not only face longer distances but also bear catastrophic out-of-pocket expenses that can trap families in intergenerational poverty.

For SC/ST households earning ≤₹6,000 monthly (42.93% and 42.7% respectively), traveling 100+ kilometers for healthcare represents an impossible financial burden. The capability to achieve basic health functioning—being free from preventable disease and premature mortality—becomes a privilege of urban residence and economic class rather than a universal entitlement, contradicting Nussbaum’s principle of equal human dignity.

3.2 Healthcare Privatization and Capability Exclusion

The urban health scenario only changed with the growth of the private sector, which now accounts for more than 80 per cent of urban health care. Allopathic private sector is almost non-existent in villages. This privatization trend fundamentally alters healthcare from a public good—essential for capability development—into a market commodity accessible only to those with purchasing power.

The privatization of healthcare creates a two-tier system that maps onto India’s caste-class hierarchies:

Tier 1 (Upper-caste, affluent): Access to quality private healthcare in urban centers, with comprehensive outpatient and inpatient services

Tier 2 (Lower-caste, poor): Dependence on overburdened public systems with limited services, long waiting times, and often substandard care

For SC households with 3.0% graduate attainment and 42.93% earning ≤₹6,000 monthly (Bihar data), private healthcare costs represent an insurmountable barrier. A routine outpatient consultation costing ₹500-1,000 in private facilities equals 8-16% of monthly income for the poorest SC families.

70-80% of the cost is paid out-of-pocket for rural healthcare visits. For marginalized caste households, this creates a vicious cycle that undermines Drèze’s emphasis on public action by forcing families into impossible choices between health and other basic needs.

3.3 Ayushman Bharat’s Capability Limitations

Ayushman Bharat provides coverage of ₹5 lakhs per family per year for secondary and tertiary care hospitalization to over 12 crores poor and vulnerable families, representing a significant policy intervention. However, the scheme’s limitation to hospitalization excludes the majority of healthcare interactions that occur in outpatient settings.

Healthcare delivery follows a pyramid structure where 90% of interactions occur at the primary care level, 8-9% at secondary care, and only 1-2% require tertiary intervention. Ayushman Bharat covers only the pyramid’s tip while excluding its foundation. For marginalized caste communities, this creates a perverse incentive structure where conditions must deteriorate to hospitalization-requiring severity before receiving coverage.

This design flaw contradicts both Nussbaum’s emphasis on bodily health as a central capability and Drèze’s advocacy for comprehensive public health systems. The scheme’s exclusion of preventive care, diagnostics, and chronic disease management particularly affects SC/ST communities who cannot afford out-of-pocket expenses for these services.

4. State-Level Case Studies: Contrasting Approaches to Welfare

4.1 Bihar: Quotas, Pensions & Tribal Housing

Bihar’s welfare policies heavily emphasize quotas and direct benefits but fall short in building long-term capabilities, illustrating the limitations of clientelist approaches:

Quotas: Reservations have escalated to 75% (SCs: 20%, OBCs: 12%, EBCs: 18%, STs: 1%), aiming to enhance representation in education and jobs (Bihar Caste Survey, 2023).

Tribal Housing: Under the PM-JANMAN scheme, 1,308 Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG) families receive ₹2.39 lakh for housing to address acute shelter needs.

Pensions and Cash Transfers:  ₹271 crore has been disbursed to 62 lakh beneficiaries under pension and girl-child schemes, providing immediate relief.

Education Deficits:  The Scheduled Caste Sub-Plan (SCSP) budget prioritizes direct aid over infrastructure, with SC/ST academic completion rates lagging (e.g., 60% secondary dropout rate for SCs). Persistent demands for enhanced scholarships highlight these gaps (India Today, 2024).

Health and Literacy Infrastructure: Teacher-student ratios range from 43:1 to 96:1, far above the recommended 30:1, and doctor availability is critically low at 1–8 per 100,000, compared to the WHO’s 1:1,000 norm.

Capabilities Assessment:  While quotas and cash transfers address immediate consumption needs, poor education and health infrastructure limit capability conversion—the process of transforming resources into outcomes like literacy or employability. For SC/ST and OBC groups, this entrenches dependency, as benefits fail to translate into sustainable empowerment. This pattern reflects what Basu would identify as institutional failure, where formal welfare schemes cannot overcome structural barriers.

4.2 Madhya Pradesh: Welfare Without Capability Structures

Madhya Pradesh mirrors Bihar’s challenges but faces additional hurdles due to weaker governance. Welfare schemes like the Ladli Behna Yojana, providing ₹1,250 monthly to 1.3 crore women, offer financial relief but lack transformative impact:

Education:  Literacy rates for SCs (58%) and STs (50%) lag behind the state average of 69% (NFHS-5, 2021).

Health:  Rural areas have only 0.7 doctors per 1,000 people, with ST communities facing the largest access gaps due to remote geographies.

Implementation Challenges: Corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies reduce scheme effectiveness, with 30% of welfare funds reportedly misallocated (CAG Report, 2023).

Capabilities Assessment: Madhya Pradesh’s focus on cash transfers provides short-term relief but fails to address systemic barriers to education and health, limiting capability expansion for marginalized castes. Weak local governance, compared to Bihar’s marginally stronger panchayati raj, exacerbates implementation failures, underscoring the need for institutional reform that Drèze emphasizes as crucial for effective public action.

4.3 Kerala: Capabilities-Building Welfare

Kerala’s Kudumbashree program, a women-led microfinance and empowerment network, exemplifies capability-focused welfare that aligns with both Nussbaum’s framework and Drèze’s public action theory. Over 43 lakh women, including 20% from SC/ST communities, participate in self-help groups that provide microcredit, skill training, and civic engagement opportunities (Kudumbashree, 2024).

Kerala’s robust infrastructure—90% literacy, 1.8 doctors per 1,000 people, and strong panchayati raj systems—ensures welfare translates into sustainable outcomes. For instance, SC/ST women in Kudumbashree have a 15% higher employment rate than national averages for their caste groups (NSSO, 2023).

Capabilities Assessment: By integrating welfare with education, health, and local governance, Kerala empowers marginalized castes to convert resources into agency and mobility, reducing clientelist dependency. This model demonstrates how expanding freedoms can create sustainable empowerment, offering a blueprint for other states. The success reflects what Drèze calls “cooperative action,” where government initiatives combine with community participation to achieve transformative outcomes.

4.4 Gujarat: Growth-First vs Welfare-First Tradeoffs

Gujarat prioritizes fiscal prudence and economic growth over expansive welfare, raising questions about equitable capability distribution. Per capita pension spending is ₹2,787, compared to Kerala’s ₹6,917, reflecting a lean welfare model (RBI State Finances, 2024). While Gujarat boasts a 7.8% GDP growth rate, caste disparities persist:

Education: SC/ST graduate attainment (4.5%) lags behind the state average (10.2%) (AISHE, 2023).

Health: Rural SC/ST communities face limited access, with only 0.5 doctors per 1,000 in tribal areas.

Welfare Schemes: Programs like the Garib Kalyan Mela provide sporadic benefits (e.g., one-time aid distribution) but lack sustained investment in capability-building infrastructure.

Capabilities Assessment: Gujarat’s growth-first approach generates wealth but fails to equitably distribute capabilities across castes. The welfare-lite model prioritizes fiscal stability over structural investments, limiting long-term empowerment for SC/ST and OBC groups compared to Kerala’s comprehensive approach. This illustrates Basu’s concern about how market-focused development can exacerbate existing inequalities without deliberate redistributive mechanisms.

5. Economic Structural Challenges: Employment, Land, and Capability Constraints

5.1 Education-Employment Disconnect and Capability Constraints

The capabilities approach assumes that education enhances individuals’ freedom to pursue valued life paths, including economic mobility. However, India’s labor market structure undermines this fundamental assumption, particularly for marginalized caste groups who invest heavily in education only to find limited returns.

India’s employment landscape reveals a stark disconnect between educational expansion and job creation. Despite increasing literacy rates and higher education access, the economy generates insufficient quality employment opportunities. This particularly affects marginalized castes who rely on education as their primary pathway to social mobility.

Formal Sector Limitations: India’s formal economy employs only 18-20% of the workforce, with the remainder in informal, low-wage, unstable employment

Skills Mismatch: Educational curricula often fail to align with market demands, leaving graduates with credentials but not capabilities

Caste Discrimination: Even educated SC/ST individuals face hiring discrimination, limiting returns to educational investment

While graduate attainment disparities exist (13.4% for upper castes vs. 3.0% for SCs in Bihar), employment outcomes reveal further inequities. Upper-caste graduates have higher likelihood of formal sector employment and professional positions, while SC/ST graduates are concentrated in government jobs (due to reservations) or underemployed in positions below their qualifications. Network effects provide upper-caste individuals with job referrals and business opportunities unavailable to marginalized castes.

5.2 Land Ownership Patterns and Agricultural Capability Erosion

India’s agricultural sector exhibits a fundamental paradox: those who own land often don’t farm it, while those who work the land rarely own it. This pattern has profound implications for capability development among rural marginalized castes.

Caste hierarchies manifest in land control patterns:

- Upper-Caste Land Ownership: Concentrated ownership of large, fertile holdings, often leased to tenant farmers or converted to non-agricultural uses

- SC/ST Land Relations: Predominantly agricultural laborers on others’ land, with limited ownership of marginal, less productive plots

- OBC Positioning: Mixed pattern of small-scale ownership and tenant farming, with better access than SC/ST but less than upper castes

The concentration of SC/ST workers in agricultural labor creates multiple capability deficits: income instability from seasonal employment, limited skill development opportunities, social vulnerability due to dependence on upper-caste landowners, and inability to accumulate assets for intergenerational mobility.

Rapid urbanization creates additional pressures where land conversion generates substantial capital gains for upper-caste owners while displacing agricultural workers who lack skills for urban formal employment, forcing them into low-wage urban informal sectors.

6. Clientelism in Caste Politics: Electoral & Capability Outcomes

Clientelist welfare shapes electoral behavior, often at the expense of political agency, a fundamental aspect of human capability that both Nussbaum and Drèze emphasize:

Electoral Trends: Support for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) among SC/ST/OBC voters rose from 24% in 2014 to 37% in 2024, driven by schemes like PM-KISAN (cash transfers for farmers) and Ujjwala (LPG connections) (Lokniti-CSDS, 2024). Upper-caste rural voters, mobilized by Hindutva cultural narratives, also bolster BJP’s dominance.

Caste Census Politics:  The BJP’s recent support for a caste census reflects its reliance on lower-caste votes, as does the opposition’s push for expanded reservations to capture similar vote banks (The Hindu, 2024).

Clientelism’s Impact: Schemes like PM-KISAN foster predictable voting among marginalized castes, with 70% of SC/ST beneficiaries reporting they vote for incumbents to ensure continued benefits (EPW, 2023). This reduces their political agency, as voting becomes a transaction rather than an expression of autonomy. Meanwhile, upper-caste voters are engaged through ideological narratives, reinforcing caste hierarchies.

6.1 Gramsci’s Passive Revolution in Indian Context

Clientelism operates not merely as a welfare strategy but as a mechanism for elite domination and consent manufacture, particularly among marginalized caste groups. Drawing from Antonio Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution, political elites co-opt the demands of subaltern classes—not to transform the existing order, but to stabilize it by offering limited concessions in the form of targeted welfare benefits.

These handouts simulate inclusion while preserving the structural asymmetries of caste and class. Through transactional welfare, elites engineer a form of consent without empowerment, where SC/ST and OBC communities vote not out of ideological conviction or political agency, but from fear of losing minimal entitlements. This process, often reinforced by media narratives and bureaucratic filtering, ensures that dissent is deflected, radical demands are domesticated, and the foundational hierarchies remain untouched. Clientelism thus becomes a tool of passive revolution, where structural transformation is deferred indefinitely under the guise of populist delivery.

Capabilities Assessment: Clientelism restricts political agency by tying welfare to electoral loyalty, particularly for SC/ST and OBC groups. This undermines their ability to act as autonomous agents in a democracy, perpetuating dependency rather than empowerment, contradicting Drèze’s vision of democratic participation as essential for development.

7. A Framework for Human Development: Beyond Transactional Welfare

Drawing from Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, Drèze’s public action theory, and Basu’s institutional analysis, this essay argues for redefining development as the expansion of human freedoms—enabling individuals to achieve valued “beings and doings” such as being educated, healthy, or politically active.

Central Human Capabilities:  Following Nussbaum, governments must ensure fundamental capabilities including health, bodily integrity, social affiliation, and control over one’s environment. In India, the failure of clientelist welfare to secure capabilities like social inclusion for SC/ST groups, due to persistent caste discrimination, highlights the need for structural reforms.

Public Action and Implementation: Building on Drèze’s work, we emphasize that weak implementation due to bureaucratic inefficiencies and elite capture undermines welfare effectiveness. In Bihar, 30–40% leakages in the Public Distribution System (PDS) reduce its impact on nutritional capabilities for SC/ST households.

Institutional Reform Perspective: Incorporating Basu’s insights, we view clientelism as a principal-agent problem, where politicians use welfare to manipulate voters, reducing democratic accountability. This necessitates institutional reforms to align welfare with long-term mobility.

In welfare terms, this comprehensive approach implies:

Structural Investments:  Kerala’s high literacy (90%) and health access (1.8 doctors per 1,000) demonstrate how infrastructure converts welfare into capabilities, unlike Bihar and Madhya Pradesh’s underfunded systems.

Democratic Governance: Strong panchayats and civil society, as in Kerala, empower communities to shape policies, enhancing agency in line with Drèze’s public action framework.

Inclusive Policy Design: Caste survey data should inform targeted interventions (e.g., scholarships for SC/ST students) rather than reinforcing identity-based vote banks.

8. Towards Inclusive Welfare: Policy Recommendations and Pragmatic Transitions

8.1 Immediate Structural Reforms

To shift from clientelist to capability-based welfare, the following reforms are proposed:

Expand Structural Investments: Increase public spending on health, education, and sanitation in caste-marginalized areas. For example, emulate Kerala’s model by building 1,000 new primary health centers targeting SC/ST regions, addressing fundamental health capabilities.

Reform Institutional Capacity: Reduce teacher-student ratios to 30:1 and ensure 1 doctor per 1,000 people, particularly in rural Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. Strengthen panchayats with training and funding to reduce leakages and improve public action.

Link Welfare to Empowerment: Tie pensions and housing schemes to skill-training programs. For instance, integrate PM-JANMAN housing with vocational courses for PVTG youth, aligning with incentive-based reforms.

Rationalize Caste Data: Use caste survey data to design targeted interventions, such as scholarships for EBC students, rather than expanding quotas that entrench dependency. This ensures caste data promotes equity without reinforcing vote banks.

Promote Political Literacy: Launch civic education campaigns via digital platforms (e.g., mobile apps) to empower welfare recipients to demand accountability, reducing clientelist influence and enhancing political agency capabilities.

8.2 Evolving Clientelist Policies: Evidence-Based Transformation

Recognizing India’s resource constraints and political landscape, abruptly replacing clientelist schemes may not be feasible. Instead, these policies can be evolved into capability-enhancing frameworks. Clientelist schemes have provided critical support in resource-scarce settings. For instance, PM-KISAN’s ₹6,000 annual transfer to 14 crore farmers has stabilized consumption and reduced poverty levels (NITI Aayog, 2024), while Ujjwala’s provision of 10 crore LPG connections has improved health outcomes by mitigating indoor air pollution.

However, these benefits remain temporary without mechanisms to convert resources into capabilities. Global and Indian research offers insights into reforming such schemes. A study by the World Bank (2023) on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSPN) demonstrated that conditioning cash transfers on public works increased participants’ income by 20% over three years. Similarly, India’s MGNREGA, when linked to asset creation, improved agricultural productivity by 15-20% in Rajasthan.

Proposed Strategies for Evolution:

1. Conditioning Benefits on Skill Development: Allocate 20-30% of clientelist benefits to participation in skill-training programs, such as vocational courses delivered through agricultural extension services. Andhra Pradesh’s pilot found a 15% income increase for farmers engaged in skill-linked schemes.

1. Integrating Health and Education Linkages:  Extend Ayushman Bharat to include conditional outpatient care, contingent on regular school attendance or preventive health visits. Kerala’s Aardram health mission reduced outpatient costs by 25% for rural households through integrated approaches.

1. Enhancing Decentralized Governance: Empower panchayati raj institutions to oversee clientelist schemes, following Kerala’s panchayat-led health initiatives that increased rural doctor availability by 30%.

1. Transitioning to Asset-Based Welfare: Shift portions of cash transfers toward asset creation, such as subsidized seeds or livestock, with repayment linked to productivity gains. Tamil Nadu’s asset support boosted women’s savings by 18%.

8.3 Addressing Implementation Challenges

Political Resistance: Incumbents may resist changes threatening vote banks. Framing reforms as enhancements (e.g., “PM-KISAN Plus”) and using caste survey data for targeting can maintain support.

Fiscal Constraints: Limited budgets can be mitigated by reallocating 5-10% of clientelist funds and engaging corporate CSR for skill training.

Implementation Gaps: Weak governance in states like Bihar can be addressed through digital monitoring and piloting in Kerala, building on proven models.

9. Comprehensive Capability Framework for Addressing Systemic Inequities

9.1 Integrated Policy Approach

The analysis reveals interconnected capability deficits that require comprehensive, rather than sectoral, policy responses:

Healthcare-Education Linkage: Poor health limits educational attainment, while low education constrains health literacy and care-seeking behavior

Employment-Health Connection: Inadequate employment income restricts healthcare access, while poor health limits employment opportunities

Land-Health-Education Triangle: Land ownership provides economic security enabling healthcare and education investment, while landlessness perpetuates capability poverty

9.2 Caste-Conscious Capability Interventions

Addressing these systemic inequities requires recognizing caste as a fundamental determinant of capability access:

Targeted Investments:  Prioritize healthcare, education, and employment programs in SC/ST-concentrated regions

Discrimination Monitoring: Track and address caste-based discrimination in service delivery across sectors

Community Participation: Ensure marginalized caste communities have voice in policy design and implementation, reflecting Drèze’s emphasis on democratic participation

Outcome Measurement: Monitor capability outcomes (health status, educational achievement, employment quality) by caste group to ensure equitable progress

Conclusion: Toward Capability Justice

India’s clientelist welfare policies risk perpetuating dependency among SC/ST and OBC communities unless anchored in structural investments that build human capabilities. Bihar and Madhya Pradesh illustrate the limits of transactional welfare without robust education and health systems, while Gujarat’s growth-first model neglects equitable capability distribution. Kerala’s Kudumbashree offers a transformative alternative, integrating welfare with empowerment to foster agency across castes.

Drawing from Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, Jean Drèze’s public action theory, and Kaushik Basu’s institutional insights, India must converge immediate relief with long-term freedoms—education, health, and political agency. By empowering civil society and leveraging caste data for inclusive policy design, India can ensure citizens across castes become agents, not clients, in a vibrant, equitable democracy.

The analysis of healthcare inequities, employment disconnects, agricultural displacement, and spatial inequalities demonstrates that these challenges intersect to create compounding capability deficits for marginalized caste communities. The capabilities approach demands more than formal equality; it requires substantive freedom to achieve valued ways of being and doing. This means ensuring that a Dalit farmer in rural Bihar has the same real opportunities for health, education, and economic advancement as an upper-caste professional in urban Mumbai.

The path forward requires moving beyond the false choice between immediate relief and long-term empowerment. True welfare policy must do both: provide necessary support while building the structural foundations that enable all citizens, regardless of caste, to lead lives of dignity, agency, and opportunity. The pragmatic evolution of clientelist schemes into capability-enhancing frameworks offers a realistic pathway, leveraging existing reach while addressing structural inequities.

Only by addressing these structural inequities through comprehensive, caste-conscious, capability-enhancing policies can India fulfill its democratic promise of equality and justice for all citizens, regardless of the circumstances of their birth. The mechanisms to reclaim policies from clientelism to structural reform through the capability approach require sustained political commitment, institutional innovation, and active citizen participation—elements that, when combined, can transform India’s welfare landscape from a tool of electoral manipulation into an instrument of genuine human development.